Fifteen years ago today, the world knew the tragedy of the attacks on the World Trade Center. The thought, first of all, and dutifully goes to the thousands of innocent victims of these attacks, represents an infamous act of cowardice unworthy of any cause.
The memory also goes to the acts of heroism and sacrifice made by the rescuers in those tragic hours, acts that have saved many lives and many others have lost.
In a decade and a half since, the crash of that day marches on in every move of American policy, with particular reference to its approach in the global power relations. An uncertain policy, made mostly of failures, thoughts, proclamations not met and a lot of uncertainty towards the future.
More than any other figure, it affects how the American political system – traditionally a perfect bipolarity between the lobby and balanced political forces – has not been able to deal with resolve and unity of action, the consequences of its own diplomatic and military strategy. The United States today is a Giant suffering from chronic imbalance, a creature wavering that can no longer assert its power as role leaders globally.
Much has been said about the causes and instigators of the attacks of 11 September 2001; on the topic. The word “order” is not written and probably will not be for a long time.
In fact, all key players accused of being the organizers of the attacks have had, in a more or less recent past, close relationships with their “victim” beginning with Al Qaeda.
The United States, first of all, has been affected by it’s own arrogance, their strategy – deleterious in the long term – to foment in distant confrontational scenarios between ideologies, communities, and religious confessions.
And what in the Eighties – for example – was an effective antidote to the Soviet power, ten or twenty years later became the cradle of snakes ready to bite the hand that fed them. A short-sighted and arrogant foreign policy.
But if you look closely, September 11, 2001 represents an historic crossroads in US foreign policy: the intent – also expressly stated by the administration in office at the time – was to collect from their slumber the American eagle, to make them take an active role on the world stage again. Animosity fed, there is reason to believe, from the rampant fringes of American industry and the Hawks Stars and Stripes patriotism.
The experience that the policy led to we would say are irrational adventures – Afghan, Iraq, and Syria, to name just a few examples. Campaigns, from incomplete and rough strategies, marked by a dull (and passed) justicialism who has never been able to confront the way with unconventional warfare.
In the deepest heart of the US, many years later, there still remains an invincible sense of frustration: the Enemy, is elusive and fluid, and mocks the efforts of the US heavy machinery with returns and wastes.
On the other hand, there is now an America who is afraid to change and express clear concepts, outlining a sensitive power strategy.
There is to be assumed that the Eagle, overcoming the trauma of the Towers, will find its own identity by abandoning the white feathers with which, in recent years, has clumsily tried to disguise himself.